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Abstract
 Iatrogenic HIV infection refers here to cases of infection with the human immunodefi -
ciency virus (HIV) caused by administration of blood products. Following the discovery of 
acquired immunodefi ciency syndrome (AIDS) in 1981, numerous warnings were issued by 
experts regarding the use of blood products. In spite of this, no switch to cryoprecipitate or 
other effective measures were taken, and the authorization of safe heated products was 
also delayed, as a result of which 40% of Japanese hemophiliacs, or some 2,000 people, fell 
victim. Additionally, since insuffi cient risk data was provided, the infection spread to 
partners, families, and other associates of hemophiliacs through secondary and tertiary 
infection. In connection, questions were asked as to the degree of responsibility of those 
institutions which had been involved in the outbreak and spread of the infection. The cause 
of the outbreak has been said to lie in the web of collusive relationships linking industry, 
government, and academia, and three groups in particular: the pharmaceutical manufac-
turers who undertook the manufacture and sale of the blood products, the former Ministry 
of Health and Welfare, which held approval and licensing authority over these pharmaceu-
tical products, and the AIDS Research Group commissioned by the former Ministry of 
Health and Welfare. Underpinning the collusion between these three groups must have 
been an unwritten law recognized among them as inviolable. This points up the pressing 
need to reform the poor practice and customs latent in Japan’s pharmaceutical manufac-
turing industry and by extension the ethos and culture of Japan’s industry and 
organizations. This article aims additionally to analyze the iatrogenic AIDS problem from a 
global perspective through international comparisons of the number of people infected with 
HIV and also to look from a ‘socio-biological’ perspective at the possibility of viral 
outbreaks in the near future and the conditions that have precipitated this hazard.
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I.  AIDS Pandemic as Man-made Disaster
(1)  Worldwide HIV hazard
 It is now over thirty years since the fi rst AIDS case was reported in Los Angeles in the United 
States in 1981, since when AIDS has spread worldwide. As of the end of 2011, the number of HIV-
positive people worldwide had reached 34 million. In response to this situation, the United Nations 
released its 2011 Political Declaration on HIV and AIDS: Intensifying Our Efforts to Eliminate HIV 
and AIDS. As of 2012, 186 countries or 96% of United Nations members had submitted a report on 
their national AIDS response measures1). Figure 1 indicates the size of HIV-positive populations, 
showing from left to right the infection rates among adults, sex workers, men who have sex with 
men, and people who inject drugs. Striking is that the HIV-positive rate among drug injectors is 22 
times higher than among the general population.
 The background to this situation regarding HIV infection is a story of massive spread of 
infection through a ‘man-made disaster’. The iatrogenic HIV infection scandal refers to a series of 
cases of infection with the human immunodefi ciency (HIV) virus, caused by the failure to apply 
safety measures to blood products. Included in these blood products were coagulation factor 
products, which are pharmaceuticals effective against hemophilia. The raw material for these 
products is prepared from the blood of many donors, and the lack of a procedure for virus inactiva-
tion left no defense against viral infection. The reported discovery of acquired immune defi ciency 
syndrome (AIDS) in 1981 led to concerns over the risk of infection through blood products, but 
despite the warnings from many specialists, the use of these products continued and resulted in some 
2,000 cases of HIV infection. According to a 1997 White Paper from the Ministry of Health and 
Welfare, of the 4,028 people with HIV as of February 1997, 1,872 had been infected by blood 
products. Meanwhile, of the 1,484 people who had developed AIDS symptoms, 641 had been 
infected by blood products. The reality was that almost half of those with HIV infection were 
victims of the scandal. This affair raised issues regarding the administration of pharmaceutical 
approval and licensing by the former Ministry of Health and Welfare and the culpability of the 
involved organizations and individuals in industry (pharmaceutical manufacturers); in government 
(the former Ministry of Health and Welfare); and in academia (the AIDS Research Group led by Dr 
Takeshi Abe).
(2)  Spread of HIV infection through pharmaceutical drugs
 Iatrogenic HIV infection differs from many other cases of iatrogenic drug damage in that it is a 
‘progressive’2) condition. What this means is that even when use of the drugs stops, the progression 
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of the symptoms does not. This is because iatrogenic HIV infection arises not from the drug side-
effects, as with most other cases of iatrogenic drug damage, but from viral contamination of the 
blood that is the raw material for the drugs. In the absence of effective therapy, HIV causes a 
gradual weakening of the immune system, leading to the onset of AIDS. As of July 1998, there had 
been 493 deaths from iatrogenic HIV infection, while the number infected was 1,434, of whom 631 
had developed AIDS. The number of deaths continues to increase. The fact that many children were 
affected is another distinctive feature of iatrogenic HIV infection, making all the more urgent the 
task of limiting the damage and developing therapies. Of those affected, 14% were 10 years old or 
younger, while 30% were 15 years or below, and those aged 20 or below accounted for more than 
half of all victims. This is why, in the fi rst report by the Research Group for Preventive Therapies 
for People with HIV Infection, the group’s chief researcher, Professor Kaneo Yamada, called 
iatrogenic HIV infection ‘one of the greatest medical tragedies of this century’. The group’s report is 
subtitled ‘The AIDS Scandal’3).
 Table 1 summarizes the iatrogenic HIV problem in terms of the number of HIV-infected people 
and the (estimated) number infected by blood products in the major developed countries4). The 
number of people infected iatrogenically through pharmaceuticals is particularly high in the United 
States and France, indicating that the damage was spread through a combination of natural and 
manmade disaster. In many countries including Japan, court actions were brought against the 
government and pharmaceutical manufacturers. In Spain, where 90% of blood coagulant products 
were imports from the United States, it is reported that 82% of the 2,700 hemophiliacs became 
infected with HIV.
 In the case of the ‘non-heat-treated’ coagulation factor products which were the medium of 
infection, although there were safety issues involved, the fact remained that they were effective for 
Table 1 International comparison of HIV-infected populations
Country HIV-infected population (1990)
HIV-infected population 
(2011)
Number infected by blood 
products (estimate)
United States 1,200,000 2,000,000 6,000‒10,000
Canada 46,000 89,000 2,000
Japan 6,900 10,000 2,000
France 120,000 200,000 4,000
Spain 97,000 160,000 2,200
Germany 39,000 82,000 1,900
Italy 190,000 200,000 1,300
UK 30,000 120,000 1,200
Source:  Eric A. Feldman and Ronald Bayer, Blood feuds: AIDs, blood, and the politics of medical 
disaster, Oxford University Press, 1999.
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many hemophiliacs and user-friendly. Compared to the cryoprecipitate preparations which were 
candidate replacements, the coagulation factor products had a stronger pharmaceutical effect, and, 
when symptoms became severe, there were apparently cases in which only coagulation factor 
products could bring recovery. Moreover, self-injection of coagulation factor products by hemophili-
acs was authorized in February 1983, offering a greater degree of user-friendliness than 
cryoprecipitate, which in principle had to be administered in a hospital. As HIV research was less 
advanced than nowadays, many doctors and patients opted for the immediate benefi ts of pharmaceu-
tical effi cacy and user-friendliness in the face of an unknown future risk, resulting in the unforeseen 
manmade medical disaster of iatrogenic HIV infection.
 Central government (the former Ministry of Health and Welfare) continued to assume the role of 
the supervision and guidance authority for pharmaceutical approval and licensing in its relationship 
with pharmaceutical manufacturers. Pharmaceutical manufacturers submitted detailed reports on risk 
data and other information to the Ministry of Health and Welfare, which provided them with 
guidance on the range of countermeasures. The former Ministry of Health and Welfare had collected 
information from overseas specialists, but this information was not communicated to medical 
treatment institutions, patients, or the general public. At the time of the fi rst confi rmed case, the 
Ministry tried to prepare a ‘soft landing’ for AIDS in Japan. Similarly, so as to avoid panic among 
the public and unequal treatment of companies, it continued to advocate a softly-softly approach. In 
court too, the government went on to adopt the role of director and defender of the accused 
companies. In addition to this aspect, there was a strong signifi cance attached to the fact that the 
disease was infectious, which meant that the damage spread through secondary and tertiary infection. 
Surprisingly, as the Ministry initially treated HIV as a public health and sanitation issue, it did not 
provide victims with medical treatment, relief, or compensation, thinking of the infection rather as a 
social evil which needed to be rooted out and eliminated.
(3)  Japan’s iatrogenic AIDS epidemic
 Detailed information on the timeline of the iatrogenic HIV infection scandal has appeared on the 
websites5) of Life AIDS Project and in a book by Hitoshi Sakurai entitled Umoreta Eizu Houkoku 
(The Buried AIDS Report). The timeline presented below was prepared with reference to these 
sources and is based on factual information already released into the public domain.
 
1981.6 The U.S. Center for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) reports fi rst AIDS patient (a male 
homosexual)
1982.7 CDC reports AIDS cases in hemophiliacs.
1982.9 CDC adopts the term acquired immune defi ciency syndrome (AIDS)
1982.12 The U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) proposes switch to cryoprecipitate and removal of 
at-risk groups from blood donor eligibility.
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 The U.S. National Hemophilia Foundation (NHF) points out the risk from blood products and the 
effi cacy of cryoprecipitate.
1983.1 NHF issues preventive warning and urges switch to cryoprecipitate.
1983.2 Ministry of Health and Welfare recognizes home treatment of hemophilia (self-injection) for 
public health insurance purposes.
1983.3 FDA authorizes manufacture of heated products by US Travenol.
 FDA recommends halt to blood donation by high-risk groups.
1983.4 CDC director points to effi cacy of cryoprecipitate and the existence of Numerous cases of latent 
infection.
1983.5 Isolation of the virus that causes AIDS (at the time called LAV) is announced in the journal 
Science. (Confi rmed as causative virus in 1984).
 FDA orders development of heated products as a measure against AIDS.
1983.6 Ministry of Health and Welfare establishes an AIDS fact-fi nding research group (AIDS Research 
Group, led by Dr Takeshi Abe).
 World Federation of Hemophilia (WFH) Stockholm Congress approve continued use of 
non-heated products.
1983.7 Hemophiliac dies at Teikyo University Hospital.
1983.9 National Hemophilia Network of Japan (a hemophilia-related association) requests the Ministry of 
Health and Welfare to speed the provision of heated products.
1984.2 Japan Travenol begins clinical study of heated products.
1984.6 Green Cross Corporation begins clinical study of heated products.
1985.3 AIDS Survey and Investigation Committee recognizes a homosexual patient at Juntendo 
University Hospital as Japan’s fi rst AIDS case.
1985.5‒6 Hemophiliac treated with non-heated products at Teikyo University Hospital becomes infected 
with HIV and dies in 1991.
1985.7 Ministry of Health and Welfare gives block approval to heated products.
1986.1 Green Cross Corporation launches sale of heated products.
1986.4 Liver disease patient is treated with non-heated products sold by Green Cross Corporation at 
general hospital in Osaka Prefecture. Patient dies in 1995.
1989.5‒10 Initial HIV-related court actions brought in Osaka and Tokyo.
1996.2 Health minister Naoto Kan accepts government’s responsibility and apologizes.
1996.3 Settlement reached in initial HIV-related court actions.
1996.8‒10 District Public Prosecutors Offi ces of Tokyo and Osaka order arrest of Dr Takeshi Abe, Akihito 
Matsumura (former head of the Ministry of Health and Welfare’s Biologics Division) and three 
successive presidents of the Green Cross Corporation.
1997.3 First public hearing at district courts of Tokyo and Osaka.
2000.2 Three company presidents are sentenced to between 16 months and two years’ imprisonment at 
Osaka District Court.
2001.3 Dr Takeshi Abe found not guilty.
2001.9 Akihito Matsumura, former head of Ministry of Health and Welfare’s Biologics and Antibiotics 
Division, sentenced to one year’s imprisonment suspended for two years.
 
(4)  Background to scandal
 Hemophilia, a disease in which constituents required for blood clotting and hemostasis are 
lacking or defi cient for genetic reasons6), requires medical treatment to supply these missing blood 
coagulation factors. Cryoprecipitate products were used as drugs to control the disease. As cryopre-
cipitate products are made from the pooled blood of one or at the most ten individuals7), it was 
expected that they would be less likely to cause infection than coagulation factor products, which 
are made from the pooled blood of between 2,000 and 20,000 people. As the fi rst cryoprecipitates 
were frozen products, their storage and use presented challenges and patients had to be treated in 
hospital, but this problem was resolved by the dried cryoprecipitate developed in the early 1980s, 
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and home treatment using cryoprecipitate did apparently take place in some cases. In countries such 
as Norway, which actually switched to cryoprecipitate, the rate of hemophiliac HIV infection was 
kept to low levels, indicating effective decision-making on health policy. This fact casts doubt on the 
basis for Dr. Takeshi Abe’s statement that ‘cryoprecipitate is liable to solidifi cation’, and instead 
points to the difference in drug price markup as one of the possible reasons why the switch to cryo-
precipitate was not realized.
 From 1984 until around 1985, many Japanese doctors viewed as specialists and many offi cials at 
the Ministry of Health and Welfare were apparently dominated by the ‘logical’ argument that 
‘although use of blood products can lead to HIV infection, many patients have not developed 
symptoms. Infection and onset of symptoms are thus separate phenomena. Although non-heated 
products may be a cause of HIV infection, they do not act to cause AIDS onset’8). AIDS is a 
disease of immune dysfunction caused by a virus called HIV. In a document published in 1986, Dr 
Takeshi Abe maintained that confi rmation of AIDS requires three conditions to be fulfi lled9). The 
fi rst was infection with the AIDS virus, which could be tested via the presence of antibody. The 
second was reduced or insuffi cient immunocompetence. The fact that this reduction of immunocom-
petence occurs over time is one of the characteristics of AIDS. For reduced immune function to 
result in onset of symptoms can take more than ten years in many cases, until which time the 
patient may experience no more than a certain degree of fatigue, with no impairment of everyday 
activities. This is still one of the features that distinguishes HIV infection from onset of AIDS. The 
third of Dr Abe’s conditions was opportunistic infection, which appears as a result of weakened 
immunocompetence in the form of illnesses such as pneumocystis carinii pneumonia and Kaposi’s 
sarcoma. As a result, medical treatment following the onset of AIDS consists of a constant battle 
with opportunistic infections.
 Figure 2 shows the number of new HIV and AIDS infections and deaths in the two subsequent 
decades from 1990 to 2010. If, as in the fi gure, the number of people dying following non-iatro-
genic infection is included in the HIV infection curve, the number of iatrogenic infections continues 
to increase. When we consider also the number of AIDS deaths due to non-pharmaceutical-related 
natural infection, such as infection through unprotected sex or needle-sharing, the extent of the 
tragedy is immeasurable. The problem of iatrogenic AIDS thus continues into the present.
 In the case of iatrogenic HIV infection, the main point of legal contention was at what point 
pharmaceutical manufacturers and the Ministry of Health and Welfare had become aware of the risk 
from non-heated products. The case in point in the criminal trial was that of a liver disease patient 
treated with non-heated products from the pharmaceutical company Green Cross Corporation in April 
1986. The court attempted to trace why the company president of the Green Cross Corporation had 
not recalled the products, and why Akihito Matsumura, the then head of the Biologics and Antibiot-
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ics Division at the former Ministry of Health and Welfare, had not ordered the recall.
II.  Systemic Breakdown due to Lost Compliance and Ghost Governance
(1)  Business Ethics and Corporate Social Responsiblity
 Since pharmaceutical manufacturers were also in a position to access risk data, they were unable 
to deny their involvement in the manufacture and sale of drugs potentially contaminated with the 
virus. Information from pharmaceutical manufacturers was reported to the former Ministry of Health 
and Welfare, but was not communicated to the hemophiliacs who were the product consumers. The 
Ministry thereby clearly neglected its duty to warn patients and the public. As for non-heated 
products, while most other countries reduced their imports, Japan sought to increase imports and 
even reduced the price as an incentive. The reason for the import of ‘unsafe non-heated’ products 
was quite simply the prioritization of earnings from the markup on the drug price. This is the profi t 
derived from the difference between the fi xed domestic price for medical products and the price 
actually paid to the overseas supplier. The markup on non-heated products was particularly great. 
With cryoprecipitate products, in contrast, there was almost none. There are also issues associated 
with the actions of those involved after the danger was realized: even after heated products became 
available, they failed to urgently recall the non-heated products which they knew to be unsafe. By 
making false reports to the Ministry of Health and Welfare regarding the dates of market release and 
recall of non-heated products, the Green Cross Corporation engaged in fraud and misrepresentation 
which compounded the damage, for which it bears a grave ‘social responsibility’. Figure 3, Organiza-
tional Model of Pharmaceutical Industry, presents a diagrammatic illustration of the interest groups 
in the industry involved in the administration of pharmaceutical approval and licensing. As shown in 
the fi gure, the Green Cross effectively engaged in bribery, including by making payments, disguised 
as ‘research funds’, to a foundation which Dr. Takeshi Abe was in the process of establishing, 
Figure 2 People living with HIV in the world
Source: UNAIDS, World AIDS Day Report 2011, 2011, pp.6‒7.
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suggesting that the ‘business ethics’ of this pharmaceutical operator were very poor. Its approach, 
which prioritized its own interest at the expense of patients and the public, aggravated the damage. 
However, this kind of poor practice was not restricted to the corporate players; responsibility also 
lies with the government authorities that administered the pharmaceutical regulatory system, which 
became ever clearer as the Japanese media (NHK) delved deeper into the scandal.
 The former Ministry of Health and Welfare had the role of providing supervision and guidance 
to pharmaceutical manufacturers. Notwithstanding its name change to Ministry of Health, Labour 
and Welfare following a ministerial reorganization, its historic responsibility for the iatrogenic HIV 
infection remains together with its duty to compensate patients and victims. This raises the question 
of the political and administrative responsibility of the regulatory authorities. Although it may not 
have been deliberately responsible if it is the case that the former Ministry of Health and Welfare 
sacrifi ced the health of hemophiliacs for the sake of pharmaceutical manufacturers’ profi t, then the 
regulatory authority itself has become a malignant infl uence on society, a situation that calls for the 
establishment of an ethical code for government organizations. The pharmaceutical regulatory system 
has been called a ‘web of vested interests’. Sorting of good medicines from bad medicines is carried 
out under government guidance through a process known as pharmaceutical inspection, but, para-
doxically, there is a greater interest vested in bad medicines than in good medicines. Pharmaceutical 
companies make massive capital investment in drug development and have to adapt to new raw 
materials and a new production line for each new drug. They need to recoup this investment, and 
the development of a single drug is thus a kind of venture project that can determine the entire fate 
Figure 3 Stakeholders of Pharmaceutical Industry
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of the company. Because of this, once a drug had been developed, because it was no longer possible 
to halt the investment in the associated production plant, it was with the intention of having it 
approved, regardless of its merit, that the company would approach offi cial bodies and the specialist 
committees and research groups that had the effective decision-making authority within the pharma-
ceutical inspection system of the former Ministry of Health and Welfare. It was this network of 
interests surrounding pharmaceutical regulation that formed the backdrop to the tragedy of iatrogenic 
HIV infection. Meanwhile, the inspection procedures and clinical studies involved in drug licensing 
under the government regulatory system require time, which often stands in the way of delivering 
medical treatment to patients who need the drug. Nevertheless, one wonders what is the purpose of 
the government regulatory system, and whether the clinical studies involved in pharmaceutical 
inspection have any useful effect. The iatrogenic HIV infection scandal brought a loss of confi dence 
in the pharmaceutical regulatory system and the former Ministry of Health and Welfare and initiated 
a fundamental questioning of the whole of Japan’s medical treatment policy.
(2)  Ghost Governance
 The administrative responsibility of the regulatory authorities involved in the iatrogenic HIV 
infection scandal (the former Ministry of Health and Welfare) was the focus of the court case. In 
court, the basis for the questioning of the Ministry’s responsibility was the Pharmaceutical Affairs 
Law, which was amended in 1979 in response to the SMON case. The amendment gave the 
Ministry the authority to close down the supply of a pharmaceutical where there was the risk of it 
creating or aggravating a health or safety hazard. At issue was the failure to exercise this authority, 
in other words negligence on the part of the regulatory authority. Specifi cally, it can be pointed out 
for instance that Japan lagged behind America by two years and four months in the approval of 
heated products. This was largely attributable to the coordination of clinical studies by Dr. Abe, but 
another probable issue was the structure whereby the former Ministry of Health and Welfare’s phar-
maceutical licensing operation was dependent on a small number of specialists. Table 2 summarizes 
the dates at which HIV antibody testing and heat treatment of concentrated product were made 
obligatory.
 Documents now made public suggest that, although the former Ministry of Health and Welfare 
had collected a large amount of risk data, it not only did not make the data public, but may actually 
have manipulated the advice from the FDA. AIDS was fi rst recognized in Japan on March 22, 1985, 
with the reporting of the case of a male homosexual resident in America, which became known as 
the ‘Juntendo University case’. The patient survived for ten years after diagnosis, and, although 
infected with HIV, is thought not yet to have developed AIDS at that time. In contrast, a hemophil-
iac who died in July 1983, known as the ‘Teikyo University case’, was not recognized as an AIDS 
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patient. It has been claimed that this was because the former Ministry of Health and Welfare tried to 
conceal the fact of hemophiliac HIV infection. Even subsequent to the licensing of heated products, 
the Ministry exacerbated the damage by failing to order pharmaceutical manufacturers to recall 
unheated product. Underlying this lax leadership, it is easy to perceive collusion between the former 
Ministry of Health and Welfare and the pharmaceutical manufacturers. The Green Cross Corporation 
of those days was described as an outpost of the Ministry of Health and Welfare’s Pharmaceutical 
Affairs Bureau10), and the practice of ‘amakudari’, whereby offi cials from the Ministry frequently 
retired into sinecure positions with pharmaceutical manufacturers, led to the formation of strong 
collusive relationships in the area of pharmaceutical approval and licensing.
 As shown in Figure 4, the background to the iatrogenic HIV infection scandal was formed not 
only by the various responsibilities of industry, government, and academia, but also by the 
undeniable fact of mutual interorganizational relationships between industry, government, and 
academia based on an ‘industrial protection policy’ peculiar to what has been called ‘Japan Inc.’ It 
was surely the collusive relationships between industry, government, and academia – a negative 
result of the mutual interrelationship of organizations in Japan’s industrial society as shown in 
Figure 4 – that lay behind the iatrogenic HIV infection scandal.
(3)  Lost Compliance
 The head of the AIDS Research Group (Leader: Dr. Takeshi Abe), was at the time Japan’s 
Table 2 Date of introduction of compulsory HIV antibody testing and heat treatment
Introduction of obligatory HIV 
antibody testing (ELISA)
Introduction of obligatory heat 
treatment of concentrated product
Australia May 1985 January 1985
Canada November 1985 July 1985
Denmark January 1986 October 1985
France August 1989 October 1985
Germany October 1985 Instead of obligatory heat treatment, no reimbursement for non-heat-treated products
Italy March 1985 July 1985
Japan November 1986 October 1985 to February 1986
Britain October 1985 June 1985
United States March 1985 October 1984
India 1987 to 1989 N/A
Thailand 1987 to 1989 N/A
Zimbabwe July 1985 N/A
Source:  Eric A. Feldman and Ronald Bayer, Blood feuds: AIDs, blood, and the politics of medical disaster, Oxford 
University Press, 1999, p.273.
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leading expert in hemophilia treatment, and was thus an infl uential and authoritative voice in the 
fi eld of medicine relevant to the iatrogenic HIV infection scandal. The AIDS Research Group was in 
fact heavily involved in important decisions that led to the compounding of the damage in the 
iatrogenic HIV infection, such as the decision not to switch from coagulation factor products to 
cryoprecipitate products. Specifi cally, at the meeting of the Home Treatment Promotion Committee 
on October 18, 1983, Dr. Abe said in respect of his earlier claim that ‘cryoprecipitate tends to 
solidify’ that ‘it might not be true’. At a time when there were doubts over the safety of blood 
products, a grave responsibility attaches to his decision not to switch to cryoprecipitate products, and 
then to delay the clinical study of the heated products when he should have been working to provide 
a safer drug as quickly as possible. In connection, it was found that doctors had had fi nancial 
dealings with pharmaceutical manufacturers, which was proven by the fact that Green Cross had 
made donations, disguised as research funds, to a foundation established by Dr. Abe.
 As part of the July 1997 reorganization of the pharmaceutical regulatory structure recommended 
in the 1997 Annual Report on Health and Welfare, the Pharmaceutical Affairs Bureau was abolished, 
and the Health Policy Bureau took control of policy on the promotion of pharmaceutical research 
and development, pharmaceutical production and distribution, and related aspects. Meanwhile, the 
Pharmaceutical and Food Safety Bureau was created to oversee the broad range of safety measures 
relating to medical treatment and pharmaceuticals, such as pharmaceutical clinical studies, approval 
and inspection, post-marketing safety measures, and measures to prevent infection within medical 
treatment institutions. In parallel, as part of a strategic upgrade and reorganization of testing and 
Government
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Figure 4 Lost Compliance: Un-legal Collusive relationships
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research institutions, the National Institute of Hygienic Sciences was reconstituted as the National 
Institute of Health Sciences, and was equipped with a Pharmaceuticals and Medical Devices 
Evaluation Center to promote survey and research work on the safety and effi cacy of pharmaceuti-
cals and foodstuffs and strengthen pharmaceutical inspection. To coincide with the reorganization, 
there was a systematic increase in the number of staff assigned to pharmaceutical inspection work, 
and the inspection system was changed: whereas previously the actual work of inspection had been 
commissioned to the Central Pharmaceutical Affairs Council, whose members were drawn from the 
outside, the core work of pharmaceutical inspection was now to be carried out in house by the 
Pharmaceuticals and Medical Devices Evaluation Center, with the Council’s role specialized to cover 
high-level assessment. Urgent steps were to be taken to set up a corresponding system of responsi-
bilities. The system of clinical study principal investigators, which had been Dr Takeshi Abe’s role 
in the licensing of heated products, was abolished.
 The new medical product approval and inspection system created by the reorganization of 
government agencies came into force in 1997. In subsequent administrative reforms, the former 
Ministry of Health and Welfare became the Ministry of Labour, Health and Welfare and there were 
changes in the content of its administrative activities including services provided and approval and 
licensing operations. Under the previous system, an Inspection Guidelines and Inspection Report 
were submitted to the Investigation Committee of the Central Pharmaceutical Affairs Council, which 
was made up of specialists from outside the Ministry. This system was replaced in November 2000 
by a simplifi ed format in which the Central Pharmaceutical Affairs Council participated in a 
so-called team inspection. This move appears to have been designed to shorten the time required for 
approval.
 In the fi nal analysis, the cause of the iatrogenic HIV infection lay in a system in which the 
government agencies that constituted the pharmaceutical regulatory authorities were effectively 
bypassed so that the effective ‘decision-making’ body for drug clinical study approval was the 
specialist committee known as the AIDS Research Group, to which pharmaceutical manufacturers 
made donations in an effort to have their pharmaceuticals approved and licensed, thus interfering in 
the process of pharmaceutical approval and license renewal. In future, lessons must be drawn from 
the iatrogenic HIV infection, and reform must be applied to the web of interests in the pharmaceuti-
cal industry and its system of cozy collusive relationships with government agencies. The poor 
practice and collusive relationships arising from the network of interests linking the worlds of 
industry and government also exemplify the need to reform, in terms of both policies and systems, 
the ethos and culture which became entrenched during Japan’s earlier period of rapid economic 
growth. An existing organizational culture must not be allowed to prevent the organization from 
learning to fi nd its way in a new age. Breaking the old culture of the past and creating a new 
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culture is an important process. The culture of poor practice which is latent within the pharmaceuti-
cal regulatory system and the pharmaceutical industry represents a form of ‘organizational inertia’ 
which still today retains the power to act against the public interest. The culture and ethos latent in 
this network of collusive relationships between Japanese industry, government, and academia may 
need to be the subject of creative destruction as we move into the near future.
 It is clear that responsibility for the organizational disaster of iatrogenic HIV infection lies with 
each of industry, government, and academia, but the background to this is the industrial protection 
policy of ‘Japan Inc.’ which is deeply rooted in the culture of the pharmaceutical industry. The 
system for approval and licensing, as administered by the regulatory government authority for each 
industry, itself spawned a network of collusive relationships between industry, government, and 
academia through practices such as amakudari, donations from private-sector bodies to the public 
sector, and expense account entertaining. The case of iatrogenic HIV infection can be seen as a 
negative result of this relationship between business and government. This underlines the fragility of 
the cultural ethos of Japanese industrial society and typifi es a system common to all of Japanese 
industry.
III.  Viral Outbreaks Caused by Global Warming: Limitations of Management and Policy
 Manmade disasters such as the phenomenon of iatrogenic AIDS infection outlined above have an 
inevitable ‘teleconnection’ with natural disasters. New viral strains and infectious diseases are one 
form of ‘unsafety threatening mankind’. Historically, tuberculosis, cholera, plague, infl uenza, AIDS, 
and other infectious diseases have claimed many victims. More recently, the worldwide spread of 
SARS and avian infl uenza in 2003 are fresh in our memory. There are fears of epidemics of the 
three major infectious diseases (AIDS, malaria, and tuberculosis) arising from the ‘biological hazard’ 
caused by the world population explosion to seven billion. Of particular note regarding the danger of 
biosocial hazard is its exponential pattern of spread. Explosive damage arises through bacterial and 
viral infection via living organisms, person-to-person infection, or infection from other species, for 
example from cattle to humans through bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE), variant 
Creutzfeld-Jakob disease (vCJD), and foot-and-mouth disease. Moreover, rubella infection in 
pregnant women may cause cataracts and glaucoma, congenital heart disease, hearing impairment 
and other conditions in the fetus, while congenital rubella syndrome (CRS) poses the risk of damage 
to the next generation. Whether this is regarded as a natural phenomenon, a case of man-made or 
natural selection, the result is the same: natural disaster and man-made disaster lead to an indivisible 
resonance phenomenon, the negative interaction of which causes the accelerated spread of ‘unsafety’.
 The WHO has published Figure 5 worldwide to alert to the risk from biological hazards. The 
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northward spread of infectious tropical diseases caused by recent global warming is proceeding at an 
ever accelerating pace. Among the hazards facing the world, the proportion represented by these 
biological hazards is second in number to natural disasters such as earthquakes, tsunamis, volcanoes, 
typhoons, and hurricanes, and accounts for one-third of all hazards.
 Meanwhile, there is concern that the disruption of the energy balance by global warming may 
allow the spread of infectious tropical diseases to the northern hemisphere. The serious prevalence of 
West Nile fever in the United States resulted from its being spread to the temperate zone of North 
America by travelers. In Japan, similarly, the example of the redback spider (latrodectus hasseltii), 
which was discovered in Osaka Prefecture and has extended its habitat to the whole country, demon-
strates that this is not an irrelevant problem. In particular the recent prevalence of Dengue fever, 
whose incidence has increased 30-fold in the last 50 years, means that over 100 countries are 
threatened by the growth of the zone of infection11). Figure 6 shows areas with high risk of Dengue 
fever infection as of 2011. The lines to the north and south of the fi gure indicate the minimum tem-
perature of 10℃ which is the habitat limit of the mosquito that transmits the Dengue fever virus. 
Like the northward advance of an army, global warming is extending the habitat of the mosquitoes 
Figure 5 Selected Emerging and Re-emerging Infectious Diseases: 1996‒2004
Source:  World Health Organization, The world health report 2007: a safer future: global public health security in 
the 21st century, 2007, p.12. Revised by Atsuji, Fujimoto, Ueda
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that transmit tropical viruses and is pushing the infection toward the northern hemisphere, which has 
a large land mass and is home to a large proportion of the human race. This poses a threat to the 
populations of these areas, who have no experience of or resistance to tropical viruses.
 Not only the abovementioned infectious tropical diseases transmitted by bacteria and viruses, but 
also the risk of infection spread through global warming and the resulting crisis will be of 
increasing concern going forward. For instance, since cholera bacteria live in symbiosis with 
plankton in seawater, the rise in sea temperatures causes plankton to breed, leading to an increase in 
cholera bacteria, which has already extended the infection zone northward. Already, it is reported 
that the 1991 El Niño phenomenon in South America has led to sharp year-on-year increases in 
cholera cases. The IPCC report of the end of September 2013 states that the world’s average atmo-
spheric temperature rose by 0.85 degrees from 1880 to 2012 and predicts that the temperature rise 
by the year 2100 will be up to a maximum of 4.8℃12), leading to fears of a ‘Global Big Melt’, 
which will precipitate a worldwide struggle over water and food resources. The freshwater available 
on the planet for human consumption as drinking water is said to represent 0.6％ of all the earth’s 
H2O, so that a Global Big Melt would mean the exhaustion of the water resources for the human 
population of seven billion. Especially in the northern hemisphere, which contains a high proportion 
of the planet’s land mass, the melting of glaciers and permafrost soil which the Big Melt refers to is 
Figure 6 Global distribution of countries or areas at risk of dengue transmission, 2011
Source:  World Health Organization, Department of Control of Neglected Tropical Diseases, 2012, p.25. Revised 
by Atsuji, Fujimoto, Ueda
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predicted to lead to the spread of viral infection to previously unaffected areas. Combined with 
‘transglobal’ movement of travelers and migrants and biological weapons, terrorism, and other 
disasters arising from manmade unsafety, these outbreaks could spread worldwide.
 Governments and the responsible departments of regulatory authorities are loath to recognize 
‘socio-biological hazard’. The leak and spread of radioactivity following the meltdown of the 
Fukushima nuclear power station, although it is a question of life and death for local residents, the 
wider community, and the Japanese population as a whole, was hidden by the government and the 
company involved. Socio-biological hazard thus cannot be controlled by central government policy 
or corporate management, who instead frequently respond with concealment or falsifi cation of infor-
mation. Nor is it susceptible to control by social or other systems. Outbreaks or pandemics of socio- 
or biosocial problems are accompanied by the breakdown of social functions, indicating the 
limitations of policy and management at the level of the national government, business enterprise, 
and organization.
 Unlike war, terrorism, and confl ict, the infl ux of people into an area of hazard results in new 
infections as contamination with the pathogen spreads along the chain among the members of 
families, communities, and organizations. National governments and the WHO have, albeit discreetly, 
sounded the alarm over the worldwide spread of locally endemic diseases not only through 
mosquitoes, ticks, and migratory birds, but also through human movement (travelers, business 
travelers). A crucial role in the zones of infection has been played by the organization Médecins 
Sans Frontières, known for its role in the discovery of SARS. In this kind of infection spread, as in 
the model predicted by J. Reason13), accidents and disasters leak through security holes, creating a 
‘resonance between manmade and natural disasters’.
 To summarize, the increased risks and crises brought about by global warming can break out 
through leaks in physical, social, and biological defensive barriers. The resulting man-made disasters 
have already brought about systemic breakdown on various fronts. The ‘survivability’ which is a 
defensive barrier programmed into human DNA does not operate in C. I. Barnard called ‘zone of 
indifference’, where hazard is not made known or perceived. Consequently, in many cases, hazard is 
only registered when a crisis emerges from the spread of damage due to the breakdown of health 
and sanitation and other social systems and functions due to the spread of infection.
 A comparison of viral outbreaks on a global scale, such as the worldwide pandemic of iatrogenic 
AIDS, reveals a similar structure. First of all, insuffi cient information disclosure allows infl ux of 
people into the infection area; secondly, government measures to suppress infection and efforts at 
organizational level by corporations or other bodies remain weak; and thirdly, there is a ‘zone of 
indifference’ outside the infection area. These three factors cause disregard for hazard information 
(de-civilization). Accurate publicity on ‘socio-biological’ hazard is therefore essential at the level of 
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international society, government, corporate organizations, and the individual, while preventing 
unnecessary or unauthorized business visits or travel to the hazard area and other issues of organiza-
tional ‘compliance and governance’ are, together with human resource management (HRM), also an 
urgent issue. The northward spread of tropical infectious diseases through global warming has 
created a need for the social systems at various levels including government, corporate organiza-
tions, and the individual. This means that the concept of an ‘eco-civilization’, promoting coexistence 
at the level of the social ecosphere, and associated disclosure of information, is the only viable 
approach to suppressing the combination of manmade and natural disasters through socio-biological 
outbreaks and pandemics.
Postscript
 In April 2002, eastern Asia was struck by the SARS virus. Following the noble sacrifi ces made 
by the organization Médecins Sans Frontières, alerts were communicated worldwide through WHO. 
At the time, I was due to leave for a period of external research at IMD Lausanne, and my offi ce 
urged me to proceed with the departure from Kansai Airport despite the risk of spreading the SARS 
infection. However, I defi ed them and postponed the departure. It was precisely on the day of my 
scheduled departure that Kansai Airport was subjected to a major disinfection operation as a 
precaution against SARS. The decision to postpone my departure after consulting my departmental 
head was a close call. If I had left on that day, I would probably have spread the infection to my 
research host institution at the IMD, and the SARS infection would have been transmitted after my 
return to many of my students and teaching colleagues. The conclusion to be drawn from this is 
that, going forward, in whatever fi eld of work, in the management of organizations of all kinds, 
response to viral outbreaks will become an urgent task for participants and administrators of 
business visits. I pray for the repose of the souls of those who died of SARS and infl uenza.
Figure 7 Mechanism of socio-biological hazard
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 The recent hostage killings in Algeria and the deaths of journalists in Syria serve to illustrate 
that the managerial staff who issue the order for overseas business trips not only have managerial 
responsibility for the individual organization, but will also bear lifelong moral responsibility and a 
duty to compensate in respect of the families of injured junior staff for their trauma and emotional 
suffering. Accordingly, it has become essential for modern management to prepare for socio-
biological hazard in organizational management by providing managerial staff with training in ‘risk 
management’ and ‘crisis management’. Looking back over the ups and downs of the Japanese 
economy, one remembers that, after the collapse of the bubble economy, a large part of the sharply 
increased number of suicides from overwork that resulted from mass layoffs and staff cuts was rep-
resented by managerial staff who had fi red their colleagues.
 Coincidentally though it may be, the author was present at the time of the military coup d’état 
under the Fujimori government in Peru and of the coup d’état at Bangkok airport in Thailand. The 
death of a student in a Japan Railways accident, the Great East Japan Earthquake, and the Hanshin-
Awaji earthquake are also among the author’s various experiences of accident and disaster. It was 
because of these that I entered my present fi eld of research with the aim of averting suffering 
caused by avoidable man-made disasters. This article is dedicated to the world, to people, and to 
mankind.
Acknowledgment
This work was supported by MEXT KAKENHI Grant Number 24530437.
References
 1) UNAIDS, Global report: UNAIDS report on the global AIDS epidemic 2012, 2012, pp.6‒8.
 2) Osaka HIV Sosyo Bengodan, Yakugai AIDS Kokusai Kaigi, Sairyusya, 1998, p.161.
 3) AIDS SCANDAL (http://www.t3.rim.or.jp/~aids/yakugai2.html)
 4) Eric, F. and Ronald, B., Blood feuds: AIDs, blood, and the politics of medical disaster, Oxford University 
Press, 1999.
 5) Life AIDS Project (http://www.lap.jp/lap2/data/yakugain.html)
 6) Kanuma, K., Yakugai AIDS Saiko, Kadensya, 1998, p.21.
 7) Kanuma, K., Ibit., p.22.
 8) Kanuma, K., Ibit., p.148.
 9) Abe, H., AIDS toha Nanika, NHK Publishing, 1986, p.28.
10) Mainichi Shinbun Syakaibu, Yakugai AIDS Ubawareta Mirai, Mainichi Shinbunsya, 1996, p.74.
11) World Health Organization, Department of Control of Neglected Tropical Diseases, 2012, p.26.
12) Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Climate Change 2013: The Physical Science Basis, 2013.
13) Reason, J., Managing the Risks of Organizational Accidents, Ashgate Publishing, 1977, pp.11‒13.
